Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy—A Window into Chinese Thinking by Erickson, Andrew S.
Naval War College Review
Volume 61
Number 4 Autumn Article 5
2008
Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy—A
Window into Chinese Thinking
Andrew S. Erickson
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erickson, Andrew S. (2008) "Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy—A Window into Chinese Thinking," Naval War College
Review: Vol. 61 : No. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/5
The new U.S. maritime strategy embodies a historic reassessment of the inter-national system and how the nation can best pursue its interests in harmony 
with those of other states. In light of the strategy’s focus on building partner-
ships to better safeguard the global maritime commons, it is vital that American 
leaders clearly understand the frank and unvarnished views of allies, friends, 
and potential partners. The strategy’s unveiling at the Naval War College on 17 
October 2007 with the leaders of nearly a hundred navies and coast guards pres-
ent demonstrated initial global maritime inclusiveness. The new maritime strat-
egy is generating responses from numerous states. As 
U.S. leaders work to implement global maritime part-
nerships in the years ahead, they must carefully study 
the reactions of the nations and maritime forces with 
which they hope to work.
Chinese responses warrant especially close consid-
eration. China is a key global stakeholder with which 
the United States shares many common maritime in-
terests. Beijing has not made any offi cial public state-
ments on the maritime strategy thus far. Yet Chinese 
opinions on this matter are clearly important, even if 
they suggest that in some areas the two nations must 
“agree to disagree.” Chinese reactions to the maritime 
strategy provide a window into a larger strategic dy-
namic—not just in East Asia, where China is already 
developing as a great power, but globally, where it has 
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the potential to play a major role as well. How the United States can maintain its 
existing status and role while China continues to rise—as the world’s greatest 
developed and developing powers attempt to reach an understanding that might 
be termed “competitive coexistence”—will be perhaps the critical question in 
international relations for the twenty-fi rst century.1 To that end, this study ana-
lyzes three of the most signifi cant unoffi cial Chinese assessments of the mari-
time strategy publicly available to date and offers annotated full-length transla-
tions (which follow, in the form of essays) so that a foreign audience can survey 
the documents themselves.2 
A PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL COMPLEX
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a long tradition of informing its pol-
icy elites on international affairs through the widespread translation of foreign 
news and documents. 
Under Mao Zedong’s leadership (1949–76), offi cial discourse was dominated 
by “doctrinalism.”3  Revolutionary leaders dedicated to “antagonistic contradic-
tions and struggle” used ambiguous ideological statements to mobilize political 
factions and launch personal attacks against their rivals. By the late 1970s, how-
ever, Deng Xiaoping had shifted the national emphasis to economic and science 
and technology development, called for pragmatic debate of policy issues and 
solutions, and thereby opened the way for market forces and more widespread 
circulation of information.4 
These factors have allowed a “public intellectual complex” to emerge 
under Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Members of this com-
munity of strategic scholars and policy makers at a wide variety of private and 
public institutions engage in increasingly vigorous debates, publish widely 
in specialized and popular journals, make media appearances, and on occa-
sion brief policy makers and even China’s senior leadership. Some intellec-
tuals are privy to internal deliberations, and a few play a major role in shap-
ing policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. Even when Chinese 
public intellectuals are not directly involved in the policy process, their views 
often matter. Their ideas may inform policy makers indirectly and even be 
adopted as policy. They may also play a role in justifying or socializing already-
established policies.5 When politics or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to 
the fore, public intellectuals may become caught up in a larger competition 
of ideas. For all these reasons, their writings are worth examining for possible 
insights into Chinese policy debates and even, possibly, government decision 
making. Chinese analysts are meticulous students of policy documents from 
major countries (particularly the United States), and they scrutinize their texts 
in the belief that wording contains specifi c insights; any signifi cant U.S. policy 
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document (e.g., the maritime strategy) is therefore likely to receive careful vet-
ting in Chinese publications.6 
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the maritime strategy has been 
subject to Chinese description and evaluation. In the fi rst year since the strat-
egy’s promulgation, it was covered extensively in China’s civilian (and, to a lesser 
extent, military) press. The vast majority of these articles, however, were brief 
and descriptive.7 Some of the more extensive ones touched on the strategy in-
directly in discussing more broadly U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacifi c;8 
a few were rather sensational in their obsession with the idea that the United 
States is attempting to “contain” China.9 
Thus far, three openly published articles stand out from the rest in their focus 
on the strategy, the detail and sophistication of their analyses, and their having 
been written by recognized experts from major institutions; they have therefore 
been selected as the focus of this study. Their respective authors’ affi liations 
suggest that their writings (in terms of variations in coverage) offer windows 
into how different elements of China’s bureaucracy, with their specifi c interests 
and perspectives, assess the new U.S. maritime strategy. While these informed 
commentaries are not defi nitive and should not be overinterpreted, they may be 
suggestive of the Chinese government’s viewpoint and future policy responses. 
The fi rst article is by Lu Rude, emeritus professor at the Dalian Naval Ves-
sel Academy.10 Lu has been a consistent proponent of maritime and naval de-
velopment and contributes frequently to debates on China’s naval priorities.11 
Lu enlisted in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in 1951, beginning 
a military career that would last for half a century, of which over four decades 
would be devoted to education in maritime navigation.12 Lu’s full-page article 
on the new maritime strategy appeared in People’s Navy, the offi cial newspaper 
of the PLAN, which is published by the service’s Political Department and pro-
vides guidance for offi cers and enlisted personnel.13 Lu outlines the new U.S. 
maritime strategy’s context, content, and implications for international security, 
particularly in East Asia. He lauds the strategy’s emphasis on confl ict prevention 
and international cooperation but places the onus on the United States to dem-
onstrate its strategic sincerity through concrete actions. He highlights the docu-
ment’s emphasis on multinational cooperation against unconventional threats 
but also draws attention to the Navy’s stated mission of “deterring potential 
competitors.”
这是美军海上战略可能发生的重大变化, 应该得到世界各国的肯定.
This could be a major change in the U.S. military’s maritime strategy. It must receive the affi rmation 
of all the world’s nations. 
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The second article is by Wang Baofu, researcher and deputy director of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University’s Institute for 
Strategic Studies.14 Wang’s comments and assessments on international rela-
tions and arms control appear frequently in China’s offi cial media, as well as 
in popular media and academic publications.15 His present article appeared in 
Study Times, a journal of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School. 
An outspoken critic of the American intervention in Iraq, Wang sees the new 
maritime strategy as the outgrowth of a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. 
military policy, methods, and objectives in the aftermath of both 9/11 and the 
early phases of the Iraq war.16 
The third article is by Su Hao, a well published professor in the Department 
of Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University and director of its Cen-
ter for Asia-Pacifi c Studies.17 He is also a board member in a range of Chinese 
organizations that focus on security, cooperation, and bilateral exchange.18 Su 
has emphasized that Chinese national interests and identity are primarily conti-
nental.19 He displays a deep understanding of the strategy’s wording, having also 
published a full-length Chinese translation.20 Su’s article appeared in Leaders, 
a popular magazine on current affairs and policy published in Hong Kong for 
domestic consumption there, as well as for a select mainland audience.
COMMON ASSESSMENTS
The three articles give a sophisticated and relatively comprehensive summary of 
the U.S. maritime strategy. They differ in assessing various aspects of the docu-
ment, and there is some tension between the commonalities that emerge from 
shared perspectives and those that are products of the articles’ having followed 
the strategy’s original structure. But the three articles unambiguously share sev-
eral major conclusions. 
A New Strategic Direction. All three authors see the new U.S. maritime strategy 
as representing a major shift from the Maritime Strategy of 1986. Each regards 
the strategies issued in the interim as products of post–Cold War strategic un-
certainties, with little lasting infl uence.21 They characterize the current strategy 
as fundamentally different. Su explains that when formulating the 2007 edition, 
“U.S. Navy theoretical circles were faced with the new situation of international 
antiterrorism and the rapid rise of emerging countries.” Wang states that the 
new strategy “not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime 
security threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use 
military power to meet national security objectives.” All emphasize the impor-
tance of the subject at hand: in Wang’s words, “As a bellwether of world military 
transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits scrutiny.”
4
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Emphasis on Cooperation and Confl ict Prevention. All three analysts praise the 
strategy’s explicit focus on cooperation. Su declares that “it prominently empha-
sizes maritime security cooperation.” Wang states that “the U.S. military’s ‘mari-
time strategy’ has already taken ‘international cooperation’ as an important prin-
ciple. This . . . indicates that the United States security and military strategy will 
face a major new adjustment.” Lu writes, “One can see that the new U.S. maritime 
strategy emphasizes ‘military software’ such as ‘humanitarian rescue missions and 
improving cooperative relations between the United States and every country.’”
The analysts all emphasize that the new maritime strategy elevates prevent-
ing war to an equal status with winning wars. They interpret war prevention as 
involving primarily soft-power operations, as opposed to deterrence based on 
war-winning capabilities to undergird otherwise cooperative approaches. Wang 
terms the emphasis on war prevention the strategy’s “most prominent feature.” 
Lu describes this “conspicuous new viewpoint” as a product of “major change” 
and recognizes the utility of “maritime military operations other than war” and 
increased “international cooperation and noncombat use of navies,” to include 
humanitarian rescue missions and improved cooperative relations with other 
regions. Su describes this as a “major bright spot.” Chinese analysts implicitly 
welcome a U.S. Navy more focused on such missions than on sea control and 
power projection. 
But the Chinese analysts are not prepared to acknowledge fully that war 
prevention may require substantial coercive capabilities. (Wang does mention 
“strategic deterrence theory,” and Su notes that the strategy, in its own words, 
“does not assume confl ict, but also recognizes the historical reality that peace 
cannot be automatically maintained”). They are examining regional maritime 
security from the perspective of China’s national interests. These include em-
phasizing the use of venues in which Beijing is relatively infl uential (e.g., the 
United Nations) to address disputes and limit foreign military infl uence. In the 
views of many Chinese, letting other states unduly shape these areas could—in a 
worst-case scenario—lead to military intervention in a manner that could harm 
China’s regional infl uence and sovereignty claims.22 In the analysts’ apparent 
unwillingness to acknowledge that confl ict prevention can sometimes rely on 
coercive capabilities, one can see an effort to emphasize desired elements of 
the document while deemphasizing or contesting undesired ones—a common 
practice in both policy analysis and international relations around the world.
有一个引人注目的新观点: 明确写入 “防止战争与赢得战争同等重要” 的观点.
There is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that “Preventing and Winning 
War Are Equally Important.”
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Mention of Multipolarity. The analysts also note the maritime strategy’s refer-
ence to a “multipolar” world. Lu describes this as a “fi rst time” shift in U.S. 
policy documents. In the translator’s opinion, however, the term “multipolar” 
describes neither the international system as it currently exists nor the world 
that U.S. policy makers would want in the future.23 Moreover, many Chinese 
audiences regard “multipolar” (多极) as having a specifi c meaning: “a world in 
which there are several major regional powers and no single superpower hege-
mon.” This situation would be realized in the near future only by substantial 
relative decline in U.S. power, to the benefi t of other emerging major powers. 
A small but increasingly infl uential Chinese school of thought promoting an 
American “decline theory” (衰落论)—which lost infl uence after it incorrectly 
predicted the emergence of multipolarity immediately following the Cold War’s 
end—has recently gained ground with the U.S. diffi culties in Iraq and else-
where.24 China’s 2006 defense white paper states that “the world is at a critical 
stage, moving toward multi-polarity.”25 The strategy’s very use of the term “mul-
tipolar,” therefore, appears to validate the Chinese government’s vision of the 
potential benefi ts of a decline in American hegemony, which it views as a threat 
to its core interests.26 To be sure, the authors surveyed clearly believe that the 
United States is still hegemonic and thus retains signifi cant deterrence power.27 
But in the translator’s view, while arrogance will only further erode American 
infl uence, actively encouraging the perception that American power is ebbing 
risks undermining deterrence capabilities in the longer term.
Together with other apparent instances of recognition by the United States of 
the limitations of its power and infl uence, the translator believes, such a change 
of attitude is likely to be seen by many Chinese as inspired not by sudden en-
lightenment in an altruistic sense but rather by growing recognition of weakness 
(in light of previously overambitious strategic goals). Indeed, the analysts cited 
here seem to welcome, as Su points out in almost Corbettian fashion, a strategy 
apparently based on recognition of limitations (U.S. “ability is not equal to its 
ambition”) and a consequent reliance on cooperation with other international 
partners. As Su states, paraphrasing the strategy itself (as do Lu and Wang), “no 
country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security of the entire mari-
time area.” In the translator’s opinion, then, the problematic use of the term 
“multipolar” thus potentially risks causing misinterpretation, miscalculation, 
and false expectation on the part of Chinese analysts—or perhaps even worse, 
making the strategy’s rhetoric seem removed from the reality of U.S. force struc-
ture and deployments. Care should be taken in further interactions with Chi-
nese counterparts to counteract potential misperceptions in this regard.
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Appreciation of Domestic Dimensions. The analysts also recognize the inter-
agency aspects of U.S. maritime cooperation and coordination. As Su notes, this 
is the “fi rst time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strategic report,” which 
“makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three maritime forces.” 
He notes the strategy’s injunction “that coordination and cooperation must be 
strengthened among the maritime forces of each military service and each do-
mestic department.” This seems to indicate recognition that cooperation and 
coordination among the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will be par-
ticularly important to the strategy’s successful functioning. Wang’s analysis, as 
will be discussed in more detail below, displays signifi cant understanding of the 
U.S. defense policy process. 
A Special Role for Naval Forces. The analysts see the maritime domain as vital 
to many nations’ development and recognize the central role that the U.S. Navy 
has played in the world. Wang contends that “the ability of the United States 
to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . comprehension of 
sea power, and [its] emphasis on maritime force development.” All three note 
that today “the majority of the world’s population lives within several hundred 
kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of world trade is dependent on mari-
time transport, [and] maritime security has a direct bearing on the American 
people’s way of life.” Lu additionally observes (using wording similar to that of 
Wang) that naval forces are particularly relevant to fi ghting terrorism, because 
of such “special characteristics” as “mobility, which gives [them] the ability to 
advance and withdraw, to deter and fi ght.” 
Asia-Pacifi c Focus. All three scholars identify the Asia-Pacifi c as a priority area 
for American naval presence. Lu describes the Middle East as a “powder keg” 
and acknowledges the status of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea—the two 
other areas specifi cally mentioned in the strategy—as strategic energy lifelines. 
But he uses his own interpretation to connect several issues mentioned sepa-
rately in the strategy, concluding that “the Western Pacifi c is determined to be 
‘a region of high tension’ where the United States has the responsibility to ‘carry 
out treaty obligations’ to its allies and to ‘contain potential strategic competi-
tors.’” Wang and Su also take notice of the maritime strategy’s specifi c mention 
of the western Pacifi c. 
Continued Hegemony. Perhaps most important, all three analysts view the 
strategy as part of a larger U.S. effort to maintain its predominant international 
在美国官方正式的文体中首次提出了多极化转化, 建设海上共同利益的 “合作伙伴.”
This is the fi rst time that U.S. offi cial writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition to 
multipolarity and the construction of “cooperative partnerships” based on maritime common 
interests.
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power and capabilities for unilateral action. They do acknowledge that the new 
strategy is far more cooperative than the 1986 version in both concept and rhet-
oric. Wang states that “overbearing, offensive language is relatively reduced, and 
there is noticeably more emphasis on ‘strategic cooperation.’” Lu notes that “the 
new maritime strategy is relatively moderate compared to the previous version 
in its use of words and style.” But, he emphasizes, while the strategy “projects 
the pleasant wording of ‘peace,’ ‘cooperation,’ and ‘war prevention,’ hegemonic 
thinking remains its main thread.” The analysts see the United States as unwilling 
to abandon the traditional “hegemony” and “sea control” that its capabilities 
have long afforded it. Wang judges that the United States retains a long-standing 
“maritime hegemonic mentality,” which he traces to Mahanian thought, and 
that the nation remains “the only superpower in the world today.” He adds: 
“Because the United States . . . places maritime power above all others, its mari-
time strategy can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than 
safeguarding the world maritime order.” Lu charges that “the hegemonic U.S. 
thinking of dominating the world’s oceans has not changed at all.” In his view, 
“what is behind ‘cooperation’ is America’s interests[;] having ‘partners or the 
participation of allies’ likewise serves America’s global interests.”
The Chinese analysts here are expressing concern that the United States re-
tains power to threaten core Chinese interests. These interests include reunifi ca-
tion with Taiwan, assertion of sovereignty over disputed islands (and associated 
resources, as well as air and water space) on China’s maritime periphery, and 
ultimately some form of sea-lane security and regional maritime infl uence. Chi-
nese concerns in this area offer a useful caution regarding the possibilities of 
U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the near term.
DIVERGING VIEWPOINTS
Despite these shared viewpoints, there are identifi able differences in focus and 
interpretation among the three analysts. By chance, the maritime strategy’s 
promulgation has coincided with a vigorous and unprecedented debate within 
China concerning its own maritime development. The three Chinese assess-
ments of the U.S. strategy, particularly in their judgments about the contours 
and directions of American strategy, cannot help but infl uence that debate.
A Model for PLAN Development?
Lu’s lengthy, complex analysis contains apparent attempts to use the new mari-
time strategy, rightly or wrongly, as evidence of an elevated position of infl uence 
for the U.S. Navy. Lu writes that the new maritime strategy of the United States 
demonstrates that its Navy “has been placed in an extremely prominent posi-
tion” and “continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. 
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global strategy.” While the latter point may seem optimistic to some, this for-
mulation does describe realistically the character of U.S. power projection from 
Lu’s strategic vantage point in maritime East Asia. Even with its current fi scal 
diffi culties, the U.S. Navy, in terms of capabilities alone, must seem very im-
pressive to the PLAN. Such a portrayal of American naval power and infl uence 
is consistent with Lu’s longtime advocacy of rapid, robust Chinese maritime 
development. 
There are several indications that his evaluation, in addition to educating 
PLAN offi cers about the U.S. maritime strategy, may also contain an implicit ar-
gument for a similar increase in the PLAN’s mission from access denial to blue-
water defense of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as consistent with China’s 
growing interests as a great power.28 More than Su or even Wang, Lu appears to 
believe that “the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry.” He notes that 
“the Western Pacifi c is the area of most intense competition among nations for 
maritime sovereignty,” that it “has the highest concentration and fastest growth 
in terms of the world’s naval forces,” and that it “is the sea area where the U.S. 
military conducts the largest and most frequent maritime exercises with its al-
lies.” Lu appears also to hint that PLAN development must inevitably be used 
to balance against American naval power projection. “Some Asian countries are 
rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess 
nuclear weapons,” he notes elliptically; “they will directly infl uence and chal-
lenge American hegemony.” 
Here Lu may be arguing implicitly for some form of PLAN power-projection 
capability, perhaps in the form of deck aviation (as might be broadly surmised 
from the context). In East Asia, he emphasizes, the United States “dispatches 
carrier battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness.” 
Were it operationally feasible, one might infer, China could benefi t from simi-
lar capabilities to protect its sovereignty claims. Also, “by setting up pointed 
defenses and carrying out strategic deployment, the United States is prepared 
to act at any time and to intervene” in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, 
where China has similar interests in SLOC security and energy access. 
In time, at least by Lu’s ambitious standards, China might likewise benefi t 
from a navy that could maximize its forward presence while minimizing its in-
ternational footprint to avoid the tremendous political risk of overseas bases—
which the PRC has foresworn since its founding in 1949. This would seem to 
. . .如此构想, 不能不说是在单边主义和先发制人战略遭受挫折之后, 对运用军事手段
实现国家利益认识上的重大变化.
This new concept . . . can only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] under-
standing of the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following 
setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.
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allow for a Chinese approach to power projection: respecting sovereignty while 
infl uencing events ashore. Wang and Su do not appear to share Lu’s emphasis or 
advocacy. But Lu’s arguments should not be dismissed as mere naval promotion. 
While likely refl ecting the PLAN’s bureaucratic interests, naval advocates like Lu 
publishing in offi cial forums must defer to the guidance promulgated by China’s 
civilian leadership. The real danger here is that if Chinese naval development 
were to be inspired by that of the United States, as would be manifest in internal 
bureaucratic debates and budgetary battles, there would be a risk of the sort of 
interaction effects that have triggered arms races.29 
Seeking Explanations in Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Politics
Wang describes the new maritime strategy as not only representing a major de-
parture from the tone of previous security documents issued by the George W. 
Bush administration but as “one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last 
twenty years.” He sees it as the logical outcome of three major factors: military 
reversals in Iraq, the failures of transformation in that confl ict, and the need for 
the Navy to justify its share of the defense budget. “The ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks 
produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. security concept,” Wang observes, in 
wording akin to Lu’s; “the U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly.” The Iraq 
war experience, Wang states, is teaching America the importance of combining 
hard and soft power to develop “rational strength.” This strategic rethinking, 
and the concepts of the “thousand-ship navy” and Global Fleet Stations, “can 
only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] understanding of 
the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following 
setbacks in earlier unilateralist and preemptive strategy.”30 According to Wang, 
“As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral Michael] Mullen repeatedly suggested 
that ‘the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime 
strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only 
control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other 
countries to maintain freedom of passage.’ It is precisely through his promotion 
that the new ‘maritime strategy’ was introduced.”
Wang’s charge of strategic overreach is broadly compatible with Su’s less abra-
sive assessment, but it stands in contrast to Lu’s, which focuses more on U.S. ca-
pabilities than limitations. Wang’s third conclusion is based on a sophisticated 
understanding of the American defense establishment and its policy processes: 
“For the maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending 
pie, they must lead strategic thinking and initiatives,” Wang maintains. At the 
same time, like many of his peers, he also alleges that “some people and military 
industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a ‘Chinese 
naval threat theory.’”
10
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Strategic Coherence
Su’s largely descriptive article contains a fairly favorable assessment of U.S. mar-
itime power and intentions. Su sees the United States as developing a coherent 
maritime policy in which the maritime strategy and “the so-called ‘Thousand 
Ship Navy’ concept currently being deliberated in U.S. Navy circles are two sides 
of the same coin.” He relates that at a 2007 Naval War College conference, “De-
fi ning a Maritime Security Partnership with China,” at which he presented an 
academic paper, “prospects for cooperation were optimistically forecast.” This 
“atmosphere,” Su concludes, “is consistent with” the maritime strategy “and 
refl ects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with 
China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United 
States.” Where Lu sees a model for PLAN development and Wang sees responses 
within the U.S. military bureaucracy to changing conditions and failed policies, 
Su sees a carefully calibrated and coordinated diplomatic message.
ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED
For all their insights, the three analysts display limited understanding of the 
bureaucratic context behind the strategy’s development. They collectively fail to 
recognize (at least in print) that the new U.S. maritime strategy is not a stand-
alone document, even in the American domestic bureaucratic context. While 
they offer interpretations of the historical background and strategic circum-
stances of its formulation, they do not mention that the new strategy was guided 
by the objectives set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the National De-
fense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Strategy for Mari-
time Security.31 
Moreover, a number of key uncertainties are neither mentioned nor inves-
tigated by the analysts. U.S. Navy modernization goals would have seemed 
another potential subject for inquiry, especially as the U.S. Navy appears fi rst 
(in 2005) to have derived a goal of increasing its 281-ship fl eet to 313 vessels by 
2020, and then to have developed a strategy for their use.32 These ambiguities 
in the relationship between the ends and means of American policy are not 
explored.
The maritime strategy was issued late in the second Bush administration, 
yet the analysts seem to assume that it will serve as a precursor of future policy 
尽管美军新的 “海上战略” 阐述了 “国际合作” 的重要性, 但并没有使其完全放
弃海上霸权思维.
Although the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” elaborates on the importance of “interna-
tional cooperation,” it has not given up its maritime hegemonic mentality.
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regardless of subsequent changes in U.S. government leadership. The strat-
egy seems to be portrayed more as authoritative policy than as a “trial bal-
loon,” yet these analysts give few indications as to how they believe it will 
actually shape U.S. policy. Most American analysts, by contrast, believe that 
the specific effects of the document on future U.S. maritime policy are not 
yet certain.33 Within the Navy, continued support by the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the appearance of the maritime strategy’s principles in key 
service planning documents (as well as national strategy pillar documents) 
will provide important barometers of success.34 None of these documents are 
mentioned directly by the Chinese analysts.35 
As in the past, reactions from other military services, Congress, and the me-
dia will signal policy and monetary support for relevant programs. Wang ap-
pears to allude to this when he states that a major rethinking of military and 
foreign policy remains under way: “The U.S. intellectual elite is in the process of 
comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact on 
policy-making departments.” Implementation of the new strategy is certain to be 
subject to budgetary limitations, particularly given the ongoing challenges asso-
ciated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. From Wang’s perspective, by con-
trast, “whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party comes to power, 
adjustments and changes in the U.S. government’s foreign policy are inevitable.” 
Wang and Su seem to appreciate the fi scal challenges that may impact American 
military spending. None of the analysts appear to entertain the idea, however, 
that funding constraints might limit the development of nontraditional low-end 
capabilities to support the maritime strategy.
Are the Chinese analysts “mirror imaging,” assuming that the strategy is a 
more authoritative document than it may actually be on the basis of their own 
experience with a more centralized policy process? Might their view refl ect a su-
perfi cial understanding of some aspects of the U.S. policy process? Perhaps. But 
just as the strategy cannot be expected to address all possible issues or contin-
gencies in detail—this would take too much space and risk its soon becoming 
outdated—the three analysts cannot be expected to address all of its contents 
and related issues. All three emphasize, however, a most important point, that a 
broad acceptance of and participation in the Global Maritime Partnership initia-
tive by the international community will be essential if the strategy is to fulfi ll its 
intended goals. Nevertheless, these collective omissions suggest that the analyses 
represent a “fi rst cut” at understanding the strategy and how it may affect China. 
The objective seems to be to consider some initial implications for maritime de-
velopment in the United States and China, as well as the prospects for future 
bilateral relations. 
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TRUE TO ITS WORDS AND RESOLUTE IN ITS DEEDS 
The Chinese analysts obviously have major concerns regarding the intentions 
behind U.S. military strategy. With respect to the maritime strategy in particular, 
they worry that beneath a veneer of cooperative rhetoric, they are being asked 
to tolerate, or even directly acquiesce in, projection of U.S. power in a manner 
that they believe threatens China’s core national interests. Here the cooperative 
implications of the strategy may run against the grain of much Chinese thinking 
regarding the United States, particularly its armed forces. 
At the same time, the Chinese analysts are heartened by the new American em-
phasis on cooperation. While retaining concerns about U.S. strategic objectives, 
they do not dismiss the strategy outright. For Lu, Washington stands at a strategic 
crossroads, at which it must demonstrate its true strategic intentions to Beijing. 
On one hand, Lu is concerned about the frequent “transnational and multination-
al maritime military exercises” in East Asia that, he believes, constitute “evidence 
that the new U.S. maritime strategy has already been put into effect.” On the other 
hand, the new cooperative approach may truly represent “a major change in the 
U.S. military’s maritime strategy,” Lu allows. “It must receive the affi rmation of 
all the world’s nations.”
The election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president in March 2008 has placed 
cross-Strait relations on an improved trajectory after eight years of instability 
under Chen Shui-bian. Meanwhile, recent developments suggest that PLAN 
missions may become increasingly compatible with the maritime strategy’s 
focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At an expanded Central 
Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004, Chairman Hu Jintao 
introduced a new military policy that defi nes the four new missions of the PLA, 
one of them being to “play an important role in maintaining world peace and 
promoting common development.”36 PLAN writings are operationalizing both 
this theme and Hu’s recent guidance that China’s military should pay attention 
to “diversifi ed military tasks” (多样化任务).37 Such factors may well support 
mission convergence and increase strategic space for Sino-American maritime 
cooperation, though it will take substantial effort from both sides to exploit op-
portunities, and it will not be easy. 
Chinese analysts will therefore likely watch the concrete actions on the part 
of the United States to see how they affect Beijing’s core strategic concerns. In 
future discussions with their American counterparts, they will probably con-
tinue to probe for U.S. willingness to commit to actions that would make China 
全世界人民乐见其战略思维的改变, 更拭目以待, 企盼其真正行动, 取得实际效果.
The people of the entire world are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will 
wait and see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.
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In recognition of the fact that the authors 
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maritime strategy, this study makes every 
effort to differentiate clearly among these 
two functions and the translator’s own 
opinions. All endnotes in this document 
have been furnished by the present author; 
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endnotes. 
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of the translator and do not represent the 
estimates or policies of the U.S. Navy or 
of any other organization of the U.S. 
government.
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